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I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the data confidentiality algorithm,
called Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), offerred by the orig-
inal IEEE 802.11 is not secure mainly due to its improper
implementation of RC4 algorithm [3], [4]. The IEEE 802.11
Task Group ’I’ (TGi) has designed two options to address
this problem. One is called Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
(TKIP), intended to be used as a short-term patch for currently
deployed equipment. The other one uses Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), a powerful block cipher recommended by
NIST to replace DES in 2000, as a long-term solution [1],
[2].
TKIP has adopted IEEE 802.1X to provide both authen-
tication and key distribution for WLAN, intending to solve
the problems in original 802.11 [2]. Among many options
provided by 802.1X, TLS handshake protocol is probably
the most secure choice, because it can achieve both mutual
authentication and key distribution.
In a wireless environment such as WLAN, the computation
power of a mobile device is usually very limited, compared to
that of a server. In the TLS handshake protocol, which involves
time-consuming public key algorithms, the computation speed
due to the client side could become a bottleneck of the system
performance. It is thus of great importance to speedup the
computation of authentication and key distribution for a power
and size constrained device at the client side.
On the other hand, Shamir has proposed a variant of the
RSA system [8] that allows for use of large moduli while
the actual operations are performed using a much smaller
modulus, compared to the operations required for a standard
RSA encryption/decryption using Chinese remainder theorem
(CRT). This method is reffered to as RSA for paranoids in [8].
In this extended abstract, Shamir’s unbalanced RSA method
is applied to authentication and key distribution in 802.11
which results in a very simple new protocol. We show that
by using the proposed protocol not only the amount of
computation can be greatly reduced but also the protocol can
be significantly simplified. We also show that our scheme is
immune to the attacks to Shamir’s ‘RSA for paranoids’ method
proposed by Gilbert, et al [6].
II. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Although TLS is a well designed protocol for authentication
and key distribution, it has disadvantages when we apply it to
WLAN. One problem is its complexity. TLS is originally de-
signed for transport layer, it is compatible for most of the sys-
tems. For instance, in the phase 1 of TLS handshake protocol,
the client and server negotiate a certain version of SSL in order
to finish the following conversation. This is because different
systems may support different SSL versions. But in WLAN,
because we only combine TLS into 802.1X, there is only one
version of SSL used for authentication and key distribution.
Therefore, negotiating SSL version is not necessary. In our
case, we still use WEP as the cipher algorithm for data privacy,
and for some efficiency concern (which will be explained
later), we will use RSA key-exchange algorithm to distribute
keys. Thus, negotiating these algorithms is not necessary. In
the second phase of TLS handshake, certificate must be sent
to each other for authentication. Server key exchange is only
necessary for a couple of certain key exchange algorithms,
such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange. But in our case, since
RSA key exchange algorithm doesn’t require any previous
parameters shared by both parties. Thus mutual authentication
is a requirement in WLAN in order to avoid man-in-the-middle
attack, the server doesn’t need to send the certificate request
to ask client for a certificate. In the third phase, because
of the same reason in phase 2, client key exchange can be
eliminated, too. During the last phase, the purpose of sending
change cipher spec is to indicate each other that right after
the authentication and key distribution, the new negotiated
algorithm and parameters will be used for data privacy. In
our case, we can combine the whole 4-phase TLS handshake
protocol into several simple steps, in order to make it suitable
for 802.11.
The proposed protocol is a simplified version of the existing
TLS protocol, which uses the unbalanced RSA algorithm for
authentication and key distribution. The proposed protocol
can be viewed as one more option for the existing suite of
protocols for 802.11.
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Fig. 1. Proposed protocol
The protocol consists of three steps, which is shown in
Figure 1. In Step 1, the client sends a client hello message
with the following parameters:
• Random: A client-generated random structure, consisting
of a timestamp and a sequence of random number. These
values are used during key exchange to prevent replay
attacks.
• Session ID: A variable-length session identifier.
• Certificate(s): One or a chain of X.509 certificates. It is
sent for being authenticated by the server.
In Step 2, the server sends the server hello message with a
session ID and his own random. The random is generated by
the server and is independent of the client’s random. Following
the session ID and the random, the server also sends its own
certificate(s), in order to be authenticated by the client. At
last, the ciphertext which contains the encrypted secret key
will be sent. In Step 3, the client first verifies the server’s
certificate which he just received. If it is approved, the client
then decrypts the ciphertext to get the secret key. So far,
both client and server have authenticated each other; and the
secret key has been distributed to both parties, too. The client
finally sends a finished message to indicate that the whole
authentication and key-distribution process is done, and from
now on, they can use the shared secret key to create lower level
secret keys, in order to transmit data by using WEP algorithm.
Another disadvantage for using TLS is that the client side
could become a bottleneck of the system performance due to
the fact that a mobile device has limited power and resources to
carry out the highly complex public-key cryptographic opera-
tions required by authentication and key distribution. However,
in WLAN, the clients’ devices are not usually computationally
powerful, like PDAs, laptop cards and cellphones. This is
a very serious problem in reality. Disregarding other factors
which may delay the time for handshake, when a user tries to
roam from one access point to another in large infrastructure
deployments, the time used for a full re-authentication and
key-distribution, is too slow to support real-time applications
such as audios and videos. A variant of the conventional RSA
algorithm proposed by Shamir [8], will be used to achieve this
goal.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
The protocol was simulated by Java programs on application
layer. Since the default packages in Java does not include
Conventional RSA Unbalanced RSA
n (in bits) 1024 1024
p (in bits) 256 1024
q (in bits) 768 1024
Time consumption for 20.73 (using CRT) 1.72
decryption (ms) M ≡ cd mod n
TABLE I
TIME CONSUMPTION FOR RSA DECRYPTION
the class to generate X.509 standard certificates, several other
providers such as BouncyCastle and Cryptix32 were added
into the Java extension file. The Java program was tested on a
laptop computer with an Intel Celeron 1.33GHz CPU and 240
MB RAM. The operation system is Windows XP. We estimate
the time consumption for RSA decryption by taking an average
of 100 times handshakes. It can be seen from Table I that the
speed up factor is about 12.1.
IV. SECURITY AGAINST THE ATTACKS
Note that the attacks proposed by Gilbert et al [6] work
for decryption using the unbalanced RSA, so we only need
to consider the security of key distribution in the proposed
protocol against the attacks. The secret key transmitted by
key distribution has a known-in-advance fixed size, and it is
assumed that p is of size larger than the size of the secret key.
If the attacker increases the size of secret key, the client would
ask for retransmission no matter whether the unbanlanced RSA
or the conventional RSA is used by the client.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we apply Shamir’s ‘RSA for paranoids’
to authentication and key distribution in 802.11. We show
that by using the proposed scheme not only the amount of
computation can be greatly reduced but also the protocol can
be signifficantly simplified. We also show that our scheme is
secure against the attacks to Shamir’s ‘RSA for paranoids’
proposed by Gilbert, et al [6].
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